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The pact is back in Nicaragua. The alliance between the ruling Frente Sandinista de Liberacion
Nacional (FSLN) and the Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC), thought dead in some quarters,
has re-emerged, as the interests of the two political polar opposites have begun to intersect. One
of the mutually troublesome issues is Eduardo Montealegre, once a serious contender for the
presidency. Now Montealegre is eying the mayoralty of Managua in elections upcoming this
November, but a recent judicial decision has whisked his party, the Alianza Liberal Nacional (ALN),
out from under him.
The FSLN-PLC intrigues played out in the Consejo Supremo Electoral (CSE) where the magistrates
decided that the ALN, of which Montealegre is president, was illegally constituted. The Frente holds
significant sway with CSE magistrates. The decision comes after two years of the ALN functioning
as a legal party and fielding Montealegre as a presidential candidate. The ALN is a breakaway party,
spun off the PLC (see NotiCen, 2005-08-05). After last year's presidential election, these two parties
appeared to have reconciled and even signed an alliance to run together in the municipal contests.
On Jan. 9, the ALN and PLC announced a coalition to run together and to support Montealegre.
They demonstrated their solidarity by joining other parties the next day in refusing to attend
President Daniel Ortega's annual speech to the legislature, leaving only the FSLN as audience. But
it started to become clear that the basis for the old PLC-FSLN alliance was still a factor the ongoing
drama of the conviction of the leader of the major Liberal faction and former President Arnoldo
Aleman (1997-2002).
The conditions of Aleman's detention have steadily, over time, improved in his favor, going
from imprisonment to house arrest to a limit only on leaving the country. These escalating
leniencies have been paid for, allegedly, with PLC cooperation in consolidating Ortega's power.
Montealegre distinguished himself during the elections by refusing to have anything to do with
these manipulations and by refusing to make common cause with the Arnoldista faction of the PLC,
which might have strengthened his presidential candidacy. In late February, the CSE ruled that
Montealegre was no longer the leader of the ALN because of what it called "legal anomalies," and
he has been ejected from the party.
The Sandinista-led CSE ruled on Feb. 20 that "a series of irregularities" had taken place when
Montealegre was elected party president in April 2006. From mayoral frontrunner, he instantly
became a man without a party. Additionally, Montealegre is seen as being under increased threat
of prosecution for his part in the collapse of four banks in 2000 and 2001 when he was finance
minister. The local press has written that Montealegre's refusal to enter into a new pact with Ortega
underlies his reversals before the bar. According to Eliseo Nunez Morales, spokesman for the
movement Vamos con Eduardo (VCE), Montealegre had rebuffed overtures from Ortega to forge an
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alliance. The CSE ruling benefited both the Arnoldista faction of the PLC and the FSLN not only by
eliminating Montealegre, but also by permanently rupturing the new PLC-ALN alliance.
The ALN chose Eliseo Nunez Hernandez (father of Nunez Morales) to replace their ousted
leader, leading PLC secretary Francisco Aguirre Sacasa to reject any new alliance because Nunez
Hernandez was reportedly an Arnoldista, and Aguirre Sacasa was not. This reopens the internal rift
over Aleman in the party. Deputy Enrique Quinonez was to be Montealegre's running mate in the
mayoral elections but, as a result of these events, has accused Aleman of sabotaging the ALN-PLC
rapprochement. Quinonez said he would join Jose Rizo Castellon, the PLC's presidential candidate
last time around, to organize a movement within the party against the return of the alliance with the
FSLN.

Altered political landscape
The CSE decisions have significantly altered the political landscape. With the return of the ALN
to the leadership of Nunez Hernandez and Deputy Carlos Garcia, the party was in the hands of
the founders of the Movimiento de Salvacion Liberal (MSL). The MSL became a member of the
coalition that morphed into the ALN in 2006, but its leadership strongly opposed domination by
the VCE, which Montealegre formed after breaking away from the PLC. The essential point the
CSE ruled on was that at the April 2006 convention that voted leadership to Montealegre, some 300
of his delegates did not have the proper credentials to have voted. The party has not lost its legal
existence, however, and was, therefore, according to political analyst Jose Somarriba, a "political
shell." Nevertheless, of the 23 ALN deputies in the Asamblea Nacional (AN), 17 indicated allegiance
to Montealegre. He also retained the support of parties with which the ALN was in coalition.
One of those is the Partido Liberal Independente (PLI). Montealegre recently said he would
continue his bid for mayor on the PLI ticket if necessary, but on March 2, the final date for filing
candidacies, liberals of all stripes suddenly agreed to run together, shutting out both the ALN
and the FSLN. This was a big strategic failure for the Frente in its quest to keep the liberals
divided and dependent. Montealegre is at the top of the ticket, and Quinones is back at his side.
The arrangement between the VCE and the PLC would give 60% of the coalition's mayoralties
nationwide to the PLC and 40% to VCE. For electoral purposes, the coalesced parties are registered
as the Alianza Partido Constitucionalista (APC) on the right and the Convergencia Nacional (CN)
on the left. The APC incorporates the PLC, the now practically insignificant ALN, and the PLI. The
CN embraces the FSLN, the Union Democratica Cristiana (UDC), and the Movimiento de Unidad
Cristiana (MUC). The FSLN now has 87 of the national total of 153 municipalities and despite this
present setback remains strong.
The failed attempt to marginalize Montealegre drew criticism against the CSE from the breakaway
left, as well. Deputy Monica Baltodano of the Movimiento de Renovacion Sandinista (MRS), an
FSLN splinter that was on track to elect Herty Lewites president had he not died prior to the last
election (see NotiCen, 2006-07-13), said the affair "was a clear political assault on pluralism in the
country." She also said, "After letting him participate as a candidate in 2006 to divide the liberals,
now they want to destroy him because they are interested in a liberalism without strong leaders."
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Baltodano also called attention to the moving up of the electoral calendar. In 2004, the alliances had
not been fixed until May and the candidates not selected until July.
The purpose of moving everything up was an FSLN attempt to prevent Montealegre from
reorganizing after the destruction of his party and to cripple the MRS as well. "They know we
still have to integrate 80% of the slates and elect 130 candidates," she said. "We are going to be
the next ones on the offensive. They are going to place all possible objections to our lists." Former
ALN deputy, now VCE Deputy Pedro Joaquin Chamorro took shots at the FSLN, too. "The Frente
has tried to avoid at all costs a ALN-PLC accord. Together, the two forces could have won about
100 municipalities. Chamorro downplayed the Arnoldistas in this. "There is no hand of the PLC,
they gained from the unity. One only has to ask a single question, 'who gains from disunity among
liberals?'" Chamorro's generosity in overlooking the culpability of the Arnoldistas despite the
presence of their sympathizers on the CSJ was striking.
Carlos Fernando Chamorro, editor of the weekly Confidencial and not incidentally the deputy's
brother, told Inforpress Centroamericana that the virtual destruction of the ALN worked out
nicely for the PLC, by placing Montealegre "between the sword and the wall" and forcing him
to be the unity Liberal candidate for mayor. There had been rumors that Montealegre would
drop out at some point to run in the 2011 presidential elections. Furthermore, pulling his party
from under the candidate served the interests of the country's big money sectors who want to
see the PLC returned to power. "They want alliance at any price. They don't mind destroying the
credibility of Montealegre, forcing him to ally with those he has criticized so often, nor [do they
mind] rehabilitating the image of Aleman," said Chamorro. He said Eliseo Nunez Morales had told
him these financiers had told Nunez they would support "the PLC and nobody else."
Both Baltodano and Envio editor Maria Lopez Vigil agreed with this analysis. They said Montealegre
would now be subjected to great pressures from this sector and that explained why he sought to ally
with the PLI. It also explained, said Lopez Vigil, why Nunez Hernandez was willing to take the ALN,
the shell with nothing but the MSL left in it, back into the Liberal coalition. She said that the MSL
had always functioned as Aleman's agent within the ALN. Lopez Vigil views the powerful private
sector as being comfortable with the FSLN in power and even with their controlling a majority of
municipalities. They just want a powerful PLC as a hedge against any future change of course.
A return to the old pact between the putatively opposing forces serves them as much as it does
Ortega and Aleman. "It is in the FSLN's interest that everyone is divided and everyone struggles
against everyone. It is in Aleman's interest to debilitate Montealegre, bring him into the PLC, and
strip him of his anti-Aleman banner," she said. Confidencial's Chamorro said that recapturing
Montealegre after his principled and high-minded refusal to have anything to do with Aleman's
PLC during the presidential campaign showed the world that those who engineered the coup "are
the institutionality of the country, they decide who participates in the elections and who can or
cannot have a party."

-- End --
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